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Anyone aiming to formulate a general theory of international law will have to take 
into account at least two factors that render such an enterprise decidedly risky. First, 
there is the circumstance that the field of international law is of broad yet uncertain 
scope. Most would agree that international criminal law and international environ-
mental law have become fixed parts of international law, despite having some pecu-
liarities (think of individual responsibility with respect to the former, or the need 
to mediate many standards through the state in case of the latter), but does interna-
tional law also cover, say, elements of labour law? Or international taxation? Or ref-
ugee and asylum law? Or questions relating to nationality? A general theory would 
first need to figure out what it will be a general theory of, and that is no easy task.1 
In this light, it is probably no coincidence that the only successful attempts at for-
mulating something akin to a general theory tend to concentrate on matters internal 
to legal thinking (rather than the relations between law and society), and do so on 
a high level of abstraction: the ‘cool structuralism’ of Martti Koskenniemi’s From 
Apology to Utopia2 is probably the best-known successful example. Others may pre-
sent a theory of sources, or a theory of authority, or even more detailed theories of 
such things as extraterritorial jurisdiction, but examples of plausible comprehensive 
theories of international law are rare indeed.
Second, conceptual pluralists figured out some time ago that the same thing can 
look different to different people, or can look different in response to different ques-
tions.3 A natural physicist may come to look at a church as yet another collection of 
particles and elements. To an architect, the same church may represent a particular 
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style of design and building. The interior designer may see it as mostly a collection 
a benches and altars. The sociologist may see the church as a collection of men and 
women assembled for some reason, which the psychologist may further flesh out. 
The faithful may view the church as a beacon of hope and comfort; and the critic 
may view the same church as a symbol of greed or oppression. The point is, that all 
of them may well be right, and not merely right from their own perspectives—differ-
ent though their respective truths are, they are not by definition incompatible—and 
much depends, again, on the chosen level of abstraction.
This is a difficult lesson to learn, as we are usually inclined to take our individual 
view of the world and absolutize it: if I am right, then others must necessarily be 
wrong—if the church stands for greed and oppression, it cannot also be a beacon 
of hope and comfort. These are thought to be incommensurable. And it comes with 
serious ramifications for scholarship, in whatever discipline. For if different ‘truths’ 
can co-exist, then it becomes difficult to establish any theory with some ambition in 
terms of the conclusiveness of its postulates and axioms.
In the light of these two concerns, one may wonder whether it is possible even to 
imagine, let alone develop, a Marxist theory of international law, if by ‘theory’ we 
mean something like a set of hypotheses and theorems or claims aiming to explain 
the world around us (and preferably better than competing theories do). Such a the-
ory would have to explain not just what role international law in the abstract plays 
(as in suggestions that ‘international law helps to oppress the poor and dispos-
sessed’), it should also tell a compelling story about how exactly this oppression 
works, preferably backed by empirical materials (any empirical materials, really4) 
rather than suggestive assertions. Moreover, such a theory should also have some 
cogency at the level of detail. How would a Marxist theory explain the duty, under 
the Geneva Conventions, to take care of the sick and wounded on the battlefield? Or 
the strict liability regime relating to satellites? Or the precautionary principle that, 
some claim, governs international environmental law? Or the right to fair trial? Or 
the practical aspects of air services agreements? While it might be possible to con-
struct a general, grand Marxist theory of international law around themes of oppres-
sion and capital accumulation and ideology (a fairly abstract theory about law and 
society), it would be much harder to construct a theory that would plausibly explain 
international law in all its considerable detail without falling into traps of vulgarity.5 
The field is simply too large and varied and open-ended, and the possibility of con-
ceptual pluralism too abundantly present to develop such a theory with any degree 
of cogency.
4 It remains an open question what ‘empirical’ means, which helps explain why calls to engage in 
‘empirical international legal studies’ remain difficult to follow.
5 One could, no doubt, explain the right to a fair trial as an attempt to generate false consciousness into 
the masses, an attempt to put forward an ideology revolving around the individual in order to reach a 
more effective level of exploitation, but surely, Occam’s razor might resist such an explanation. That 
said, a fairly plausible critique of civil and political rights in general (and in the abstract) is that their 
endorsement has diverted attention away from other forms of maltreatment of individuals, including 
labour market insecurities and the dismantling of the welfare state in quite a few Western societies.
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B.S. Chimni is far too sophisticated an international legal academic, and far 
too sophisticated a Marxist, to even try. For him, a Marxist theory stands not so 
much for a coherent and comprehensive set of statements claiming to explain all of 
international law, but stands rather for a critical attitude, inspired by some insights 
stemming from Marx and Engels and some of their later interpreters, but without 
any claim to comprehensiveness. Chimni’s Marxism is ‘Marxism as mindset’, one 
might say, a constant reminder that international law can be used for purposes of 
oppression of various groups of people, that doing so is wrong, and that there might 
be more equitable ways of doing things. Chimni himself consistently refers to his 
work as an ‘approach’: an ‘integrated Marxist approach to international law’, and 
that sounds about right, with the adjective ‘integrated’ representing the idea that the 
sources of inspiration are not only to be found in the writings of Marx and his fol-
lowers, but also stem from elsewhere, in particular post-colonial studies and feminist 
approaches. For, as Chimni rightly points out, a critique of international law along 
strictly materialist lines and revolving around the notion of a struggle between the 
classes should not be allowed to hide the oppression of women and the global south.
The book suggests that it is a second edition, and in a way it is, but it differs 
markedly from the first edition, published a few generations ago in 1993, when the 
world (including the world of international law and international lawyers) was still 
a very different place. That first edition contained sympathetic but critical discus-
sions of various approaches to international law: the classical realism represented 
by Hans Morgenthau; the policy approach of Myres McDougal and associates; the 
world order approach endorsed by Richard Falk, and the socialist international law 
voiced by Grigory Tunkin. The chapter on Tunkin has been taken out of the second 
edition, whereas the other three have been updated and to some extent re-worked. 
They have come to be accompanied by chapters on critical international law or new 
approaches to international law6 (discussing the work of David Kennedy and Mar-
tti Koskenniemi) and feminist international law (mostly discussing a pioneering 
study by Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin). All this takes up some 440 
pages, leaving another 110 pages for the development of Chimni’s integrated Marx-
ist approach.
Chimni does not offer a critique of mainstream, positivist international law in 
any detail, and for good reason. It is clear, to him, that mainstream positivism is 
the dominant approach, and that there is little to be gained by offering a critique. 
Instead, his intellectual interest goes to approaches that offer some alternative (those 
who have already formulated a critique of the mainstream), and his project is best 
understood as an attempt to learn from these alternatives precisely in order to offer 
a more plausible alternative. Morgenthau’s realism may have been overblown, but 
it offers the insight that the role of power cannot be completely ignored. The pol-
icy approach of McDougal and friends may have been too indeterminate and blurs 
the relative autonomy (from politics and policy) of the legal sphere, but nonethe-
less aimed at being comprehensive. Richard Falk’s work may have paid too little 
6 I will fiercely resist the popular habit of rendering various approaches as acronyms—doing so helps to 
reify the approach concerned, and should automatically be suspect.
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attention to the role of capital, but at least displayed more sensitivity towards third-
world scholarship than most rival approaches, and Falk has never been shy ‘to speak 
truth to power’.
If the chapters on Morgenthau, McDougal and Falk rehearse the first edition 
(even if they have been seriously updated), the more intriguing chapters are the ones 
on the critical and the feminist approach. As with Morgenthau, McDougal and Falk, 
Chimni is basically sympathetic, but unsparing in his criticism. Of some of David 
Kennedy’s work it is said that his internal critique ‘is neither particularly novel nor 
of great value’ (at p. 262) and ‘profoundly ahistorical and apolitical’ (at p. 263). 
Kennedy and Koskenniemi are chided for what he refers to as their ‘methodologi-
cal individualism’ and the well-nigh complete neglect, in their structuralist early 
work,7 of the plight of the global south, despite the circumstance that some very 
good work from the global south had already been available to them, such as the 
work by Georges Abi-Saab or Mohammed Bedjaoui, among others. The influence 
of the external realities on the internal structure of legal argument is never grasped 
by Kennedy or Koskenniemi. The main substantive gripe seems to be that Kennedy 
and Koskenniemi—the latter in particular—exaggerate the structural indeterminacy 
of international law (from the perspective of the colonized there was nothing inde-
terminate about the law), and Koskenniemi’s proposed culture of formalism ‘is a 
fuzzy idea that does not hold much attraction for the weak or legal professionals 
who really wish to advance the cause of the weak’ (at pp. 343–344).8
Few men write about women’s rights or feminism, and perhaps for good reason. 
The risk of being (or being seen to be) patronizing always lurks around the corner. 
Chimni, however, has not been deterred, and offers a lengthy critique of in particular 
the landmark study by Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries 
of International Law.9 The main flaw he identifies is that Charlesworth and Chinkin 
remain caught up in a broadly liberal approach, fighting symptoms (women are 
discriminated against and under-represented in international decision-making pro-
cesses) without thinking too much about underlying causes and the deeper structures 
underpinning international law and global governance.
Chimni’s own integrated Marxist alternative is best seen, as mentioned, not so 
much as a systematic theory, but as a constant reminder that there is more to inter-
national law than meets the mainstream eye. The function of the preceding chapters 
was, it seems, to make visible various possible other conceptions and point out their 
weaknesses and strengths (which, in all fairness, he also does—and often quite gen-
erously so), so as to sensitize the reader to what follows. The integrated Marxist 
approach—and again, note the word ‘approach’—is built around what he considers 
to be the five determining logics underlying international law, i.e. a logic of capital, 
of territory, of culture, of nature, and of law. Each of these enjoys a certain relative 
autonomy, and this alone is a plausible and useful insight. Law, for instance, is too 
8 My own take on the proposed ‘culture of formalism’ is set out in Klabbers (2013).
9 Charlesworth and Chinkin (2000).
7 Koskenniemi (1989); for Kennedy this refers mostly to a set of articles published in the 1980s and 
1990s, and his International Legal Structures (Kennedy 1987).
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often seen as merely an adjunct to power or policy or the economy, thereby deny-
ing the law’s own dynamics and the distinctness of legal reasoning. By the same 
token, culture (or ideology perhaps) has a dynamic all of its own, working in tandem 
with the other logics yet distinct. International lawyers are well attuned to the logic 
of territory, so much so that they often fall victim to the ‘territorial trap’,10 at the 
expense of identifying other important determinants of politics and governance. And 
of those, the supreme determinant in Chimni’s view, is the logic of capital, to which 
he assigns ‘relative primacy’ (at p. 448).
Chimni’s integrated Marxist approach is just that: an approach. It does not, and 
was never intended to, cover international law in all its rich detail, but suggests that 
it may well be illuminating to look at international law with a Marxist sensibility, 
with a keen eye to identifying its complicity in oppression and exploitation. But not 
just that: international law can also be a beacon of hope. Chimni is mindful of the 
circumstance that international law has ‘also responded in some instances to the 
concerns of marginal and oppressed sections’ (at p. 498).
Thus far, this second edition of International Law and World Order has mainly 
attracted the interests of others with an interest in establishing a Marxist approach, 
and this has almost inevitably resulted in some internecine debates, with a lot of 
energy going into disputing some of the finer niceties of Marxist theory. Robert 
Knox has suggested that Chimni is too quick to dismiss the commodity form theory 
launched by China Miéville some years ago11; Konstantina Tzouvala has taken him 
to task for not integrating a radical enough feminism into his Marxist approach,12 
while Umut Öszu queries how Marxist Chimni’s approach really is.13 And in a 
lengthy soul-searching essay, Akbar Rasulov wonders whether one can be a Marxist 
international legal scholar to begin with (he answers in the affirmative).14
Yet, it would be a great pity if the reception and discussion of Chimni’s work 
remained limited to the select group of international lawyers that think of them-
selves as Marxists. Amidst the lengthy chapters on various approaches, and the long 
chapter on the integrated Marxist approach, Chimni offers many useful and refresh-
ing insights, both on substantive international law and on the authors he takes to 
task, and he is nothing if not a fair critic. While he may memorably complain that 
much of David Kennedy’s historical work ‘is ahistorical by design’ (at p. 271) he 
also recognizes that Kennedy has helped to debunk any myths concerning progress, 
and has ‘helped liberate generations of international law scholars from the confines 
of arid positivism’ (at p. 303).
Sometimes, on very rare occasions, the work derails a little. Surely, the sweep-
ing claim that ‘humanitarianism is the ideology of imperialism since the sixteenth 
10 The locus classicus is Agnew (1994).
11 See https ://www.ejilt alk.org/imper ialis m-commo dific ation -and-emanc ipati on-in-inter natio nal-law-
and-world -order / (visited 23 July 2018). This refers predominantly to Miéville (2005).
12 See https ://www.ejilt alk.org/readi ng-chimn is-inter natio nal-law-and-world -order -the-quest ion-of-femin 
ism/ (visited 23 July 2018).





century’ (at p. 301) is a bit all too sweeping perhaps, and the suggestion that the 
Soviet Union suffered from a ‘lack of understanding’ concerning the causes of envi-
ronmental crises (at p. 205) strikes as uncharacteristically naïve towards the Soviet 
Union. If Soviet scholars could put men on the moon and develop nuclear technol-
ogy, they surely must have been able to understand some of the causes of environ-
mental problems—although they may have been ordered to disregard them.
One of the mysteries as well as attractions of the law is that it can be different 
things to different people—or sometimes even different things to the same people. 
This duality has been captured in various ways: Hart spoke of nightmares and noble 
dreams15; Oakeshott, employing a different perspective, spoke of societas and uni-
versitas,16 and Koskenniemi, employing yet another perspective, of Apology and 
Utopia.17 It is one of the many merits of Chimni’s International Law and World 
Order that he captures both aspects. His approach offers both a critique and, if not 
exactly a way forward, at least a sensibility that, in turn, may offer hope. He realizes 
that international law can be complicit in oppression and exploitation, but refuses to 
accept that this is all there is, and refuses to slide into nihilism. For legal nihilism, so 
he suggests, ‘is the luxury of armchair academics. It cannot inform social and politi-
cal movements in the real world’ (at p. 477).
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